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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the seriousness of the offense under 
investigation itself create exigent circumstances of the kind 
that under the Fourth Amendment justify a warrantless search 
where the State fails to establish an emergency threatening 
life or limb? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
with intent to distribute for value case, involving a search of 
a residential premises which uncovered incriminating evidence. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The appellant's Motion to Suppress the seizure of 
certain evidence, specifically, bales of marijuana and drug 
paraphenalia, came before the District Court of the Third Judicial 
District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Judge 
Judith M. Billings, presiding, on the 4th day of August, 1986. 
On the 26th day of August, 1986, the appellant was 
found guilty by jury verdict of the offense of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute for value. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On the 3rd day of October, 1986, the appellant was 
sentenced by the Honorable Judith M. Billings to serve a term 
of 0 to 5 years in the Utah State Prison, with said sentence to 
be stayed and the appellant to be placed on probation and serve 
30 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
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STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS FOR REVIEW 
At approximately 7:30 a.m. on April 14, 1986, at 
2049 Atkin Avenue, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, a residence 
shared by the appellant, her minor child, and her male companion, 
Terry L. Bakker, there was loud knocking on the front door. It 
awakened the appellant and Mr. Bakker went to investigate. 
The appellant remained in bed a few seconds until she 
heard a crash and the screen door slam. She stood up on the bed 
and looked out the front window. She saw a male person running 
down the street, but she could not see Mr. Bakker. She got up, 
put her clothes on, and went to the front room, where Mr. Bakker 
was standing. He stated, "Somebody shot me, Babe." 
Mr. Bakker showed the defendant where he had been shot. 
He looked down to his chest and fell into a rocking chair. He 
told her to call the police. She went to the bedroom and called 
911. She returned to the front room. Mr. Bakker was not there. 
She went outside the house and looked down the street. She 
saw no one, except Mr. Bakker, who was lying underneath his 
truck. She took him from underneath his truck and held him to 
her. She heard sirens coming up the street, so she laid him 
down and flagged the police down. She went back and picked him 
up. 
The police arrived and took her into the house. She 
called her sister at approximately 7:45 a.m. and told her that 
Mr. Bakker had been shot and to hurry to her. She then stood 
- ?-
in the front room and watched Mr. Bakker through the front 
screen door u n t i l her s i s t e r arr ived at approximately 8:10 a.m. 
At tha t time, the appe l l an t ' s s i s t e r not iced the 
ambulance was approaching the scene, and there was yellow police 
tape around the house. The police were taking pic tures and 
were hauling things out of the house. The police did not leave 
an inventory l i s t with the appel lant , nor at the residence. 
One policeman took the appellant and her s i s t e r to 
the backyard. 
The media arr ived at approximately 8:30 a.m. and ques-
tioned the policeman in charge. The media l e f t , and one of them 
returned at approximately 9:00 a.m. He s t a ted , f ,I got down to 
the s t a t ion , and they asked if I got p ic tures of them bringing 
marijuana out of trie house." The sher i f f sa id , flno comment.11 
While the appe l ian t ! s s i s t e r was ta lk ing to the 
policemen, one of them said Mr. Bakker had been involved with 
the pol ice and drugs for years , and that they had found 3 bales 
of marijuana in the "basement." Sne asked why they were not 
taking that outside the house as they had the other marijuana. 
The policeman said they were waiting for a search warrant to 
a r r ive at the scene. 
The appe l l an t ' s s i s t e r le f t the scene to take her 
mother to work. When she returned at approximately 11:30 a.m., 
the police had the search warrant. 
The police removed that marijuana from the house at 
- 3 -
approximately 1:00 p.m. They removed the yellow tape from 
around the house and left at approximately between 2:U0 p.m. 
and 2 :15 p.m. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE CASE 
The evidence from the warrantless search and seizure 
should have been suppressed; and without such evidence, there 
was insufficient evidence to convict the defendant. 
Therefore, the case should have been dismissed at 
trial. 
ARGUMENT 
THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE OFFENSE UNDER 
INVESTIGATION DOES NOT ITSELF CREATE 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE KIND THAT 
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT JUSTIFY A 
WARRANTLESS SEARCH WHERE THE STATE 
FAILS TO ESTABLISH AN EMERGENCY THREATEN-
ING LIFE OR LIMB. 
This appeal is based upon the claim that the warrant-
less search in the instant case was constitutionally unjustified. 
The State contends that the motion was properly denied in its 
entirety on the ground that since the house was a "murder scene," 
the search was wholly permissible. In so arguing, the State is 
only partly correct. Issues of the propriety of the search of a 
"murder scene11 and the extent to which such a search may be upheld 
are controlled by the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. Z408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 
(1978). The Mincey decision rejected the notion of a blanket 
so-called "murder scene exception" to the warrantless requirements 
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of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the court held that the 
well-accepted "exigency11 doctrine, along with its limitations, 
were applicable to such a situation. There at 437 U.S. 392-
393, S.Ct. 2413-2414, 57 L.Ed. 2d 299-300, the court held: 
The State's second argument 
in support of Arizona's catigorical 
exception to the warrant requirement 
is that a possible homicide presents 
an emergency situation demanding 
immediate action. We do not question 
the right of the police to respond 
to emergency situations. Numerous 
state and federal cases have recog-
nized that the Fourth Amendment does 
not bar police officers from making 
warrantless entries and searches 
when they reasonably believe that a 
person within is in need of immediate 
aid. Similarly, when the police come 
upon a scene of a homicide they may 
make a prompt warrantless search of 
the area to see if there are other 
victims or if a killer is still on 
the premises. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, 
supra, 435~U.S. [499] , at 510, 9 8 
S.Ct. [1942], at 1950-1951 [56 L.Ed. 
2d 486.] fThe need to protect or 
preserve life or avoid serious injury 
is justification for what would other-
wase be illegal absent an exigency or 
emergency.f Wayne v. United States, 
115 U.S. App.D.C. 234, 241, 318 F.2d 
205, 212 (opinion of Berger, J.) 
And the police may seize any evidence 
that is in plain view during the 
course of their legitimate emergency 
activities. Michigan v. Tyler, supra, 
436 U.S. at 510, 98 S.Ct. [2022] 
at 2037-2038 [29 L.Ed.2d 564]. (Emphasis 
added.) 
But a warrantless search must be 
1
 strictly circumscribed by the exigencies 
which justify its initiation"; ' Terry v. 
Ohio, 3y2 U.S. [1] at Z^-Zb, 88 S.CJt. 
TTTO8] at 1882 [20 L.Ed.2d 889] [44 
-5-
Ohio Ops. 2d 383] and it simply cannot 
be contended that this search was 
justified by any emergency threaten-
ing life or limb ..,..(Emphasis 
added.) 
Applying these tests, it is clear that a motion to suppress 
would have been properly denied in this case had the objects 
been in the officers1 flplain view11 as they entered the outside 
property in response to the emergency call. Further, the same 
conclusion could have been reached surrounding the trail of 
blood leading to the doorway where the deceased was shot. This 
was not the case, however. Here, at the time of their entrance 
onto the outside property, the police were informed that the 
killers had never entered the home, and, in fact, had fled the 
premises. As a result, looking throughout the home, opening 
doors, allegedly to find further victims or the assailant, 
particularly with respect to the linen closet, was not part of 
the Mprompt ... search of the area to see if there are other 
victims or if a killer is still on the premises . .." deemed 
permissible by the court in Mincey, supra. 
It is well-settled that, subject to a few narrow excep-
tions, searches conducted outside the judicial process, without 
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 
88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed2d 576 (1967). Those seeking to rely on 
an exception to the warrant requirement have the burden of demon-
strating its applicability. E.g., People v. Williams, 613 P.2d 
-6-
879 (Colo. 1980). 
In the instant case, there were two analytically 
distinct searches conducted by the police. The first was during 
the initial entry onto the outside property in response to the 
emergency call reporting the shooting of Terry L. Bakker. The 
second occurred when, after becoming aware of the fact the 
killers had fled and that the only other occupant of the house 
— Michelle Pursifull — was outside the structure attending to 
the decedent, and after securing the premises, the police con-
ducted a more extensive search inside the house and seized 
several items of incriminating evidence. The basis and scope 
of permissible police activity at the time of the initial entry 
onto the property, and after the permises were secured, will be 
analyzed in turn. 
The court may find that the initial entry onto the 
outside premises was gained by consent. The evidence would 
support this finding. The record does specify appellant placed 
the call to the police after Mr. Bakker was shot, and it is reason-
ably inferable from this that the call which summoned the police 
was placed with the express or implied agreement of both the 
appellant and Terry L. Bakker. 
But, although the appellant did not expressly limit 
her consent to the later police presence inside her home, at no 
time did she make any statements or engage in any conduct which 
would lead the police to believe she desired an unlimited search 
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of her home. 
Further, the police who responded to her plea for 
assistance would have understood from all the circumstances 
that the appellant desired only a limited search of her home. 
The home Mis accorded the full range of Fourth Amend-
ment protection,11 Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 
424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966), for it is quite clearly a place as 
to which there exists a justified expectation of privacy against 
unreasonable intrusion. Katz v. United States, supra. It is 
beyond question, therefore, that an unconsented police entry 
into a house constitutes a search within the meaning of Katz. 
Here, there can be no doubt that the request for 
assistance and the conduct of appellant after the police arrived 
suggested her consent to the entry onto the outside premises 
for the purpose of getting medical assistance for Mr. Bakker. 
But, knowing as fact there was simply one victim, who was under a 
vehicle in the driveway; and knowing as fact the killer had 
never entered the house; and knowing as fact that the killer 
had fled the premises following the shooting; and knowing as 
fact that the appellant was outside the residence attending to 
the victim; the court should conclude that knowing all of the 
existing factual circumstances, the police could reasonably 
understand that the appellant had placed a limitation upon 
her consent for the search of her home. This is prticularly 
true in light of the fact she never gave consent for the police 
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to actually enter her residence, nor was she ever told of the 
extensive search proposed by the police — without even an oppor-
tunity to object. 
The court should conclude that knowing all of the exis-
ting factual circumstances, the police who responded to her 
plea for assistance could reasonably understand that appellant 
placed a limitation upon her consent for the search of the outside 
premises. See People v. Annerino, 97 111. App.3d 240, 52 111. 
Dec. 714, 422 N.E.2d 923 (1981) (defendant's consent to have 
deceased removed from his kitchen not consent to enter crawl 
space to retrieve bullet); State v. Young, 135 Ariz. 437, 661 
P.2d 1138 (App. 1982) (bartender is calling police to bar where 
shooting occurred, had not thereby consented to a wholesale 
search of the premises, including removal of ceiling tiles to 
find gun); State v. Jolley, 68 N.C. App. 33, 314 S.E.2d 134 
(1984) (defendant's summoning of police after she shot her 
husband was consent lfto come into the house to aid the victim11 
and thus did not justify 6-hour search of home thereafter). 
Moreover, these facts, combined with the fact the 
residence was surrounded and secured by police officers, in 
the words of Mincey, ncan hardly be rationalized in terms of 
the legitimate concerns that justify an emergency search.!! 
Here, under the Mincey standard that a warrantless 
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search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which 
justify its initiation, the facts simply fail to establish that 
the search of the linen closet was justified by any emergency 
threatening life or limb. 
After having received details of the shooting during 
the emergency call, and once upon the outside prmeises, the 
police were in a position to observe the body and to conclude 
that death occurred by violent means. The police were also in 
a position to observe that a trail of blood led to the doorway 
of the house in question, and allowed them to conclude not only 
that the deceased had been shot in that doorway, but had sub-
sequently staggered out to the driveway. Anything the police 
saw in plain view on the outside premises, or in the doorway 
that might provide evidence of how the death occurred was subject 
to seizure, and testimony concerning that evidence should not 
be suppressed. 
But, to the extent that the police search activities 
at the time of entry into the dwelling went beyond discovery 
of items located in plain view, they must be supportable by the 
doctrine of exigent circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
In an appropriate case, a prompt and limited warrant-
less search of a homicide scene may be necessary to determine 
if there are other victims or if the perpetrator of the crime is 
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still on the premises but undetected. Mincey v. Arizona, supra. 
It must be remembered, however, that a warrantless search is 
strictly circumscribed by the exigency which creates its jus-
tification. In no case may a specific emergency be used to 
justify a general exploratory search. The guiding principles 
are that a search based on exigent circumstances requires the 
presence of an immediate crisis, and the police response must 
be strictly limited to that action necessary to respond to the 
exigency. People v. Gomez, 632 P.2d 586 (Colo. 1981); McCall 
v. People, 623 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1981). 
In the instant case, the police were notified of a 
single murder, that the shooting had taken place in the doorway, 
that the killers had never entered the home and fled the outside 
premises, that the deceased1s body was in the driveway, and that 
there was no other victim. Once the house and outside premises 
were secured by the police, and after the appellant continued to 
be excluded from the house, any exigent circumstances disappeared. 
In addition, having secured the premises, there was no 
further danger to the police or to others and there was no risk 
that relevant evidence might be destroyed. Nor can the State 
rely on the plain view exception to support their later search 
beyond the doorway since that exception requires a previous jus-
tification for the presence of the officers. People v. Franklin, 
640 P.2d 226 (Colo. 1982). Absent a warrant, the subsequent 
search was permissible only if the police obtained consent to 
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this condurct. No such consent was given. 
At the court in Lara v. State, 464 So.2d 1173 (Fla. 
1985) states: 
We find that the exigent circum-
stance exception applies when 
police are called to the scene of 
a homicide and that it allows an 
immediate warrantless search of the 
area to determine the number and 
condition of the victims or survivors, 
to see if the killer is still on the 
premises, and to preserve the crime 
scene. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 
385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed. 2d 290 
(1978); Zeigler v. State, 402 So. 2d 
365 (Fla. 1981), cert, denied, 455 
U.S. 1035, 102 S.Ct. 1739, 72 L.Ed.2d 
153 (1982). Id., at 1177-1178. 
No such exigent circumstances existed in the instant 
case. 
Therefore, the evidence obtained by the unreasonable 
search of residence should have been supressed and the case 
dismissed because of insufficient evidence. 
There was no evidence that the defendant dealt in drugs 
nor even that she knew the drugs were in the house. She was con-
victed solely on the grounds that she was living in the residence. 
This case should be reversed; or, at least in the alternate 
remanded for a new trial. 
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARQUMENT 
Appellant requests oral argument under Category No. 2 
of the new order ot his court filed January 8, 1986. (Priority 
of Cases Scheduled for Oral Argument, 25 Utah Adv. Rep 4.) 
-12-
Respectfully submitted this i ^ -J^day of May, 1987. 
ife 1 £^±==4=2^ PftlL L. HANSEN 
800 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the JLfJ2~May of May, 1987, 
four (4) copies of Brief of Appellant were served on the 
office of the Utah Attorney General, 236 State Capitol 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, addressed to the 
attention of Sandra Sjogren, Assistant Utah Attorney General. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
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Notice is hereby given that the above-named defendant hereby 
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PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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